A Burmese solution
An interview with the Chairman of the Parliamentary
Democracy Party in the liberated Burma area
RALPH BACHOE
Perspective: Thailand's Prime Minister
has been concerned
about the lack of political progress between the military regime
and political parties in Burma, and had proposed a political
initiative called Road Map to Democracy, which suggested
that the military rulers, political groups and ethnic minorities
engage in a dialogue to resolve the political situation towards
democratic government. What is the PDP's response to the
Road Map?
Bo Aung Din:
We know what has been reported in the newspapers
and on the radio, but we have not seen the text of the Road Map. However,
we believe that there are
positive elements in Thai Prime Minister's proposals.
The fact that he has made constructive proposals shows the concern of
the region about the political instability and economic disruption in
Burma. Political stability is a motor for economic investment and development,
which brings in employment opportunities. In such an environment, multilateral
trade with Burma's neighbours will increase.
It is important to remember that the instability in Burma had been negatively
affecting the Thai economy. Investors have shied away or postponed investments
because of the political situation in Burma. It is simplistic and a misreading
of the regional economic dynamics to say that Thailand is encouraging
the chaos in Burma for its own selfish economic advantage. Furthermore,
it is easy to blame others for our own country's problems, which we _
the Burmese and the ethnic groups _ must take responsibility.
To summarise, we welcome the Road Map proposals as it contains positive
elements, particularly multiparty politics, democratic political dispensation,
elections, and dialogue among all political groups with the military rulers
in search for a viable political settlement.
Perspective: Most of the other political groups have reacted very
negatively to the Thai Prime Minister's Road Map to Democracy for Burma.
They have dismissed it as "Thailand's interference in Burma's domestic
affairs."
Bo Aung Din: It is regrettable that other political parties have
reacted negatively in an impulsive way. On issues of political importance
and on the governance of Burma, we believe that it is necessary to reflect
carefully and explore the possibilities before dismissing them.
The other parties are mistaken; dialogue, reconciliation and the search
for democracy through negotiation are paramount issues to be explored
by those who want find a realistic solution to Burma's problem of military
dictatorship.
Some of these political groups are bound in a time-warp based on the 1990s
general election. They will, we quote, "not accept any political change
which is not based on the results of the 1990s elections."
We find this not only politically offensive, it also offends the accepted
idea of a finite political mandate given to a political party via a general
election, which must be renewed by periodic elections.
It is now 13 years since the NLD won the general election on a programme
to get rid of the military junta and bring back democracy. It has failed
in both tasks. The military junta is stronger and more entrenched. The
NLD's mandate has been spent after two terms _ eight years. There is certainly
no mandate for the NLD now.
It is a manifestation of its dictatorship tendencies to continue to claim
a mandate. That the NLD is allowed to get away with it bodes ill for Burma.
Like all other parties, including the ethnic minorities groups, the NLD
must compete in a multiparty general election by submitting their individual
political programmes to the electorate, and by letting the people choose.
If the mandate is again given to the NLD in this manner, it will be acceptable
to us. But not otherwise.
Perspective: Please explain the PDP's strategy to end military
dictatorship in Burma.
Bo Aung Din: Our party has settled on a dual strategy to end military
rule in our Motherland. These are one, political and two, liberation via
armed struggle.
These two strategies are underpinned by our action-oriented political
organisation directed at all the ethnic communities and the majority working
together to end military rule by negotiation, up to the point where the
military agrees to give up political power to an all-party Interim Administration.
Security matters will remain with the army but under civilian oversight.
The Interim Administration will prepare an electoral roll and organise
a General Election with the help of the United Nations which will also
supervise it.
Perspective: Your political strategy seems very optimistic. What
makes you believe that the military junta will agree to your proposals?
Bo Aung Din: While we agree with that our political strategy is
optimistic, the political situation in Burma today is a mass of violence
and oppressive military rule. It is important to have a vision of hope
and optimism.
Furthermore, we believe that the military junta is finding the management
and burden of power increasingly difficult. This is proven by the increasing
violence, intimidation and repression of the population.
These events elicits the condemnation of the international community for
the military's human rights violations. It also brings economic sanctions
and threats of personal accountability for the violations.
Furthermore, human rights violations and economic sanctions affect the
Burmese economy negatively.
We know that these issues are of genuine concern among the top officers
of the military junta. They are seeking a way out of their predicament.
They are seeking a way to protect themselves from the consequences of
their illegal seizure of power.
It is important to see that the original coup makers are now gone or retired.
Those who have taken over are prisoners of military rule. Only the use
or threat of force _ as well as the logic of maintaining power _ compels
them to hold on to power. Even if they want to end military rule, they
genuinely do not know how to do it because they fear a civilian government
and what it will do after it takes over.
It is important to understand the military's predicament and to take incremental
confidence-building measures, which will eventually lead to substantive
negotiations, which in turn will result in a viable political settlement
between all political parties and the military.
This is why we are optimistic.
The PDP is determined to save the military junta from themselves by persuading
them to hand over political power while an Interim Administration made
up of all the political parties and the ethnic communities give them an
indemnity for their human rights violations.
What we are suggesting is a pragmatic and realistic approach which considers
the existing dynamics of power in Burma.
Perspective: What will the PDP do if the military junta rejects
its overtures for negotiations? After all, the NLD has failed to achieve
any success despite its attempts at a political settlement.
Bo Aung Din: It is unfair to say that, just because the NLD has
failed, the PDP will not succeed. The policies and political programmes
of the PDP are totally different from those of the NLD.
We are, first and foremost, committed to multiparty democracy politics
and are willing and ready to engage in competitive general elections by
submitting ourselves and our political programme before the electorate.
Second, unlike the NLD, we do not claim an everlasting election mandate
even though our leader, Premier U Nu, was overthrown by a military coup.
Unlike the NLD, we are not asking for power to be handed over to the PDP.
We are prepared to compete in a multiparty democratic general election.
After 13 years, the NLD today, demands that its 1990 General Election
mandate entitles them to take power from the military junta. It is not
willing to submit to a General Election _ why? _ we may ask? What has
it achieved for the people which will make it deserving of a mandate?
Also, the PDP approach to solve the problems of military rule are distinctive,
innovative, and pragmatic. The PDP understands the military junta's problems,
the rulers' fears of slipping from power and their struggle to achieve
peace among the inside factions so that they will all survive.
Because the PDP understands and appreciates these concerns, its approach
is realistic. It does not seek to humiliate the military nor seek revenge.
We in the PDP believe that it is important to end our motherland's 41
years of suffering by embracing the realities of today's political situation
and by adopting a solution that accepts these realities.
However, if our overtures fail because of the arrogance and obstinacy
of the military junta, the PDP has an armed force for defensive purposes.
This liberation force will intensify activities to wear down the demoralised
rank-and-file soldiers until the junta comes to the negotiating table.
The PDP has a lot of support among the rank-and-file soldiers and has
significant support among senior officers who want to divest themselves
of power but do not know how to do it.
We are confident that we will prevail against the military junta. It is
not a question of 'if' but of 'when' victory will be achieved.
Perspective: You have not mentioned how many members the PDP has.
Bo Aung Din: As of April 2003, our membership was 123,000 on the
Thai border. Inside Burma, it was 86,300.
We are still collecting the number of people who joined our party since
May, but I can say that the numbers are substantial.
We hope to have these up-to-date figures by the New Year 2004 when the
verification audit is completed out by our Audit Division. Among these,
we have an active 20,000 guerrilla wing.
Perspective: Impressive. Does the PDP have members from the ethnic
communities?
Bo Aung Din: Yes, we have many. The PDP has been working with the
ethnic groups for many years.
Perspective: Does the PDP agree with the current SPDC Road Map,
which will draw the Constitution?
Bo Aung Din: The PDP is vigorously opposed to the SPDC Road Map
and rejects its attempt to draw up a Constitution. The reason is, the
SPDC is an illegal regime and has no mandate from the people.
Only a multi-party Constitutional Conference _ after a General Election
_ has the legitimacy to discuss and draw-up a Constitution under an impartial
Chairman.
This is why we object to the military junta setting the agenda for a constitutional
conference under their chairmanship.
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